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Introduction 
 
 
Turkey in Afghanistan 
A Successful Stakeholder, But a Difficult Partner 
Cem Sey and Günter Seufert 
The global increase in Islamist violence, state disintegration in Asia and Africa and 
the resulting influx of refugees to Europe are forcing the international community to 
intensify its focus on the promotion of peace in crisis regions and on social reconstruc-
tion. It may be useful to draw on the experiences in Afghanistan when responding to 
future challenges. Here, particular attention should be paid to Turkey, whose strategy 
and approach differ from those of other states, and whose involvement in Afghanistan 
is generally deemed successful. Simultaneously, the experiences gathered in Afghani-
stan also permit assertions to be made regarding Turkey as a partner in terms of 
security cooperation – a highly topical issue. 
 
Fourteen years after the start of the inter-
national mission in Afghanistan in 2002, 
overriding public opinion has it that the 
operation has, in general, been a failure. 
Although almost all military operations 
to combat the Taliban were crowned with 
success, it proved impossible to establish 
a stable political system, a functioning 
administration and an effective judiciary 
despite strenuous financial and personnel-
related efforts. Moreover, a large proportion 
of the Afghan population believes that it 
has unfairly borne a disproportionate 
amount of the costs of the conflict, and that 
the Afghans have not benefited sufficiently 
from the reconstruction which has taken 
place to date. The international community 
can boast quantifiable success in the fields 
of women’s rights, education, health and 
the media. However, these achievements, 
lacking as they do the required economic 
and social underpinnings, all rest on very 
shaky foundations.  This is only surprising 
at first glance, as the mantra of the majority 
of states involved in Afghanistan can be 
described via the following formula: secu-
rity is the prerequisite for political stability, 
and political stability the requirement for 
economic development. Today, it is evident 
that this strategy has not borne fruit, and 
that none of the three aforementioned 
pillars – including security – can be con-
structed as an independent entity. 
Turkey’s economic strategy 
Turkey did not make this error. It appeared, 
prima facie, to have been operating in 
Afghanistan with the same instruments as 
the other states: armed forces, development 
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cooperation organisations and NGOs. How-
ever, Ankara added two additional tools 
to the equation: foreign trade policy and 
private investors. In point of fact, trade 
cooperation and its own economic interests 
were and are original elements of Turkey’s 
involvement in the country. Ankara had 
declared its economic interests as early as 
2001, this clearly and without a false sense 
of shame. These lie predominantly in the 
energy and transport sectors. Afghanistan’s 
documented oil and gas resources are, in 
the mid- and long-term, of just as much 
interest to the Turkish economy as Chinese 
plans to construct new, transregional trans-
port routes (Silk Road project) destined to 
lead through Afghanistan to Anatolia. In 
2012, TPAO, Turkey’s state-owned oil com-
pany, invested 100 million US dollars and 
embarked on the drilling of boreholes in 
successfully explored oil and gas fields in 
northern Afghanistan. 
This open pursuit of its own interests 
does not appear to have harmed Turkey to 
date. On the contrary, the Afghan side is 
more likely to view itself as being on an 
equal footing if it is addressed as an eco-
nomic partner as opposed to a beneficiary 
of aid. Ankara’s encouragement of private 
companies to invest in Afghanistan is also 
having a positive impact. Several Turkish 
construction companies succeeded in gain-
ing a foothold on the Afghan market within 
a relatively short space of time. In the first 
few years of Western involvement, they 
carried out several NATO assignments in 
the fields of structural and civil engineer-
ing. Thanks to the experience gained in the 
process, they were subsequently able to 
secure larger public construction and infra-
structure projects. Several sections of the 
Afghan ring road, designed to connect the 
country’s major cities, were thus built by 
Turkish enterprises. 
As far as trade policy was concerned, 
Ankara identified local economic bottle-
necks and used these successfully for its 
own economy. As a result, Turkish business 
professionals maintain a strong presence 
on the Afghan market today. Turkish prod-
ucts are in demand. They are frequently 
superior in quality to those of Chinese, 
Pakistani and Iranian competitors, as well 
as being affordable. One advantage of 
Turkish entrepreneurs is doubtless that 
they are more willing to take risks than the 
majority of European and American trades-
people. Turkish entrepreneurs and their 
employees have also been kidnapped or 
even killed. Nevertheless, they have, in the 
majority of cases, avoided holing them-
selves up behind high walls topped with 
barbed wire. In this way, they gave locals 
the impression that they were in a similar 
position and did not set themselves apart. 
Turkish companies also enjoy great respect 
locally as they use Afghan manpower. 
Although wages are modest, having a job 
in Afghanistan is a privilege in a country 
labouring under an extremely high rate of 
unemployment. 
The Turkish development agency TİKA 
is also concerned with Afghanistan’s eco-
nomic development. The road construction 
works and agricultural measures it imple-
ments are invariably output-oriented. Cool-
ing systems were constructed in the north 
of the country, for instance, which allow 
Afghan farmers to store their products and 
thus improve their sales prospects. If Af-
ghanistan’s economic advancement can be 
linked with Turkish interests, so much the 
better. During his visit to Kabul in April 
2015, TİKA’s President Serdar Çam stated 
that Turkish industrial machinery could 
further the establishment of SMEs in Af-
ghanistan, primarily in sectors including 
textiles, chemicals, mechanical engineer-
ing, food processing and packaging. 
Turkish security policy 
Turkey is also striking out on its own in 
the realm of security policy, collaborating 
closely with the other intervention forces 
on many issues. Ankara endorses a regional 
solution to the conflict, and therefore 
initiated the so-called ‘Istanbul process’. 
Within this, Turkey has not only included 
all Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, 
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but is also cooperating with the superpowers 
USA, Russia and China and medium-sized 
states such as the United Kingdom and Ger-
many. Turkish generals were frequently in 
command of various sections of the ISAF 
troops. Turkish officers commanded the 
entire ISAF mission twice, and Turkey 
assumed responsibility for security in the 
capital Kabul and in the Wardak province 
three times. Today, Ankara protects the 
international airport in Kabul. Experienced 
politician Hikmet Çetin held the office of 
NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in 
Afghanistan two consecutive times on Tur-
key’s behalf. 
Ankara is also heavily involved in the 
training of the Afghan National Army and 
the National Police Force. Turkish officers 
and police personnel not only train their 
Afghan colleagues – in their tens of thou-
sands – in Afghanistan. Trainees are also 
invited to spend extended periods in Tur-
key, where they participate in programmes 
held at military and police academies. Tur-
key also funds several military schools in 
Afghanistan itself. The Turkish secret ser-
vices collaborate with their international 
partners, and share intelligence with them, 
including information gained from areas 
other services find it extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to infiltrate. 
Notwithstanding this close cooperation, 
Turkish involvement in military measures 
is often deemed merely symbolic. This is 
because Turkey refused to participate in 
military campaigns against the Taliban, 
in the fight against terrorism, and also in 
operations against drug production and 
trafficking from the outset, even staying on 
the margins as far as mine clearance is con-
cerned. Ankara wishes to send a signal to 
the Afghan population that “we are not an 
occupying power” – a message which has 
got through. Not once have Afghan rebels 
attacked Turkish troops; Turkish soldiers 
are highly regarded by the Afghan govern-
ment and the population alike. Turkey’s 
educational and cultural work is aimed at 
consolidating and propagating this positive 
image of Turkey within the country. 
Turkish commitment to education 
and culture 
Ankara decided to make Afghanistan a 
focus of its development cooperation at the 
beginning of its involvement in the coun-
try. Between 2005 and 2015, the develop-
ment agency TİKA, comparable with the 
GIZ (German Society for International 
Cooperation), executed over 800 projects – 
more than half of these in the fields of 
education and health. Today, TİKA is in the 
pleasing position of being able to state that 
it is enabling over 100,000 children to 
acquire a basic education and has provided 
over five million Afghans with access to 
medical care. 
However, Turkey’s educational and cul-
tural work not only focuses on these goals, 
which are, in a sense, universal; it also 
strives to establish a special relationship 
between the people of both states. For 
instance, TİKA made the University of Kabul 
a present of a modern building which is 
used to house the Department of Turkish 
Studies. Moreover, Turkey grants 500 schol-
arships to those wishing to pursue their 
studies in Turkey each year, and is the only 
country besides India to accept large 
amounts of Afghan students. 
As far as religion is concerned, TİKA 
has renovated or reconstructed dozens of 
mosques and grave sites of pious men. The 
agency is currently erecting a mausoleum 
for the former Afghan president Burha-
nuddin Rabbani in Kabul. Investments like 
these are well received by the Afghan popu-
lation, whose citizens are very proud of 
their culture and religion. 
Turkish involvement in other regions 
is also characterised by a similar thematic 
orientation to its cultural and educational 
work in Afghanistan. For TİKA, this means 
that it aligns itself strictly to the ideas and 
convictions disseminated by the ruling Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP), which, in 
turn, heavily influences the choice of their 
Turkish cooperation partners. In Afghani-
stan, TİKA collaborates with the affluent 
state-owned Turkish Foundation for Reli-
gion (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı). The Turkish 
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NGOs involved with TİKA all have a strik-
ingly Turkish-nationalist, Islamic profile. 
This applies to the Foundation for a United 
Asia (ABV), the Cansuyu Assistance and 
Cooperation Organisation and particularly 
to the Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(İHH), which played a leading role in the 
attempt to break through the Israeli naval 
blockade of the Gaza Strip. 
Probably the most dynamic Turkish civil 
society activists in Afghanistan are affiliated 
to the so-called Gülen movement (or Hiz-
met). Its current conflict with the Turkish 
government has failed to stifle the move-
ment’s efforts in Afghanistan to date. The 
Gülen movement, which considers the 
exiled Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen as 
its spiritus rector, includes the aid organisa-
tion ‘Kimse yok mu?’ (‘Is No One There?’) 
and eleven private schools, including those 
for girls. The Gülen schools enjoy an excel-
lent reputation and also attract parents 
from the country’s elite. In addition to Eng-
lish, they teach Turkish at a very high level, 
which directly benefits the Turkish eco-
nomic and political landscape. The most 
active members of the Gülen movement 
serve voluntarily in Afghanistan. The major-
ity move there for several years with their 
families. Additionally, the movement 
brings several dozen Turkish students to 
Kabul, where they study for several years 
at the city’s university. All this makes the 
Afghan population feel that they have, in 
the Turks, found equal partners. 
Turkey as a partner 
Turkey’s successful work in Afghanistan 
and its ability to procure direct access to 
the state and its people strengthens the 
country’s western allies in their resolve to 
collaborate more intensively with Ankara 
during future peacekeeping and develop-
ment operations. As a result, western states 
have openly been urging Ankara to seek 
membership within the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
This committee also observes the develop-
ment cooperation of its member states in 
terms of “internationally recognised objec-
tives”, which makes a certain transparency 
in conjunction with the work performed 
vital. 
At present, there is little to suggest that 
Ankara has decided to take such a step. This 
is because the Turkish government views its 
development work as part of the struggle 
with western countries for spheres of influ-
ence, above all in the Islamic world, a com-
petition perceived as inevitable. 
This attitude is apparent in statements 
made by members of the Turkish govern-
ment. In TİKA’ annual report of 2011, the 
then Deputy Prime Minister and current 
Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ wrote that 
the agency strengthens, “above all, the his-
toric and cultural ties” of the Turkish race: 
“In order to meet their expectations and to 
increase Turkey’s strategic significance, we 
must raise our development cooperation to 
a level which allows us to exist in competi-
tion with other nations.” 
In an interview with the Turkish news-
paper Aksiyon, TİKA’s President, Serdar Çam, 
emphasised the fact that Turkey and west-
ern countries were pursuing conflicting 
interests in terms of their development 
cooperation. Implying that the West was 
engaging in a development policy post-
colonial in nature, Çam stated the follow-
ing, in a good example of ‘putting words 
into someone’s mouth’: “The Afghan author-
ities always say that Turkey is the only 
country which helps without furthering 
its own interests. We are there to help the 
people above ground and not because of 
the riches to be found below it.” 
Turkey’s successful operations in Af-
ghanistan serve as a valuable example to 
the West, which it can use to develop its 
own ideas. However, as long as the Turkish 
government believes itself immured in a 
type of prophetic rivalry with the West, 
hopes of closer cooperation must be pruned 
back to realistic proportions. 
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